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ment guarantees against excessive bail being required, it was argued that by necessary implication
C. Bases and William F. McDonald. Washingthere exists a right to release on sufficient bail. It
ton, D.C.: Georgetown Institute of Criminal
was further argued that the fifth amendment right
Law and Procedure, 1972. Pp. ix, 121. $-.
to a fair trial would be violated by a pretrial adThe Georgetown Institute of Criminal Law and
judication of guilt and by pretrial punishment in
Procedure and the Vera Institute of justice have
the form of incarceration. Since the proposed precombined to present this study of the first experi- ventive detention law was essentially unpreceence under the controversial preventive detention
dented, legal scholars could and did argue vehelaw in the District of Columbia. 1 Considering the mently that the law was either constitutional
amount of heat generated by the law in the law because it was sufficiently narrow that it properly
reviews, the Congress, and the press before it went
preserved individual rights, or unconstitutional
into effect, Preventive Detention comes as rather an
because it broadly swept away basic rights. The
anticlimax. The most striking feature of this study
eighth amendment excessive bail clause has never
is that preventive detention was sought against
been definitively interpreted by the Supreme Court
only twenty defendants in the first ten months the and until it is, the constitutionality of preventive
law was in effect, February-November, 1971. The detention will remain undetermined. The proconstitutionality of the law had yet to be tested at
cedural due process aspects of the law's constituthe publication of the study in March 1972 because
tionality depended at least as much on how the law
so few defendants were subjected to the preventive
would be applied as on how it was written.
2
detention process.
This was the posture -of the defenders and opThe idea behind the preventive detention law ponents of preventive detention before it went into
was that if judges were given authority to deny
effect: the law and order camp thought it had found
any form of release before trial to certain dangerous
a powerful new tool against crime in the streets;
persons who were arrested for certain types of
the civil libertarians descried the incarceration of
crimes, then it would no longer be necessary for the large numbers of people who had not been proven
judges to accomplish this purpose by setting ex- guilty. Only the enactment and implementation of
orbitantly high bail. It was thought that the genthe statute could prove either side to be correct.
eral public would be saved from future crimes comPreventive Detention was rushed to publication in
mitted by drug addicts and others with a marked
hopes of providing at least some data on the implepropensity for recidivism while they were out on
mentation of the law to an expectant world.
bail or otherwise released before the trial of a previThe authors have provided short case histories
ous crime. Judges had always taken "danger to the
of each of the first twenty defendants for whom
community" into account when they set bail, even
preventive detention has been proposed. Their
though they never admitted doing so, went the
summary shows that ten were ordered detained.
reasoning, despite the doctrine that the sole pur- Of the ten, five had detention reversed on appeal or
pose of bail was to assure attendance at trial.,3 Why
rescinded. Not one of the ten was detained any
not give the bail-setters a surer way of accomplishlength of time dose to the statutory maximum of
ing this end, then, and let them do it openly?
sixty days. The authors then set out a summary of
Numerous constitutional arguments greeted this
questions that have arisen concerning the proproposal. The most significant ones involved the cedure under the statute, questions which have not
eighth amendment excessive bail clause and fifth
been answered because of the dearth of appellate
amendment due process. Since the eighth amendreview. They also state their finding that about one1 D.C. CODE § 23-1322 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
third of District of Columbia felony defendants
2
A class action was attempted to test the constitumay be eligible for preventive detention, but that
tionality of the law, but it was dismissed on jurisdicdetention has been proposed for only 2% of that
tional grounds. PRE ENTrE DETENTION 5 n.10.
Danger to the community has long been accepted
number. They conclude with a few observations
as a factor in denying bail pending appeal, but not
concerning why the procedure has not been used.
before trial. E.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 405 U.S.
1205 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1972).
It is those concluding observations which ought
PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA: THE FIRST TEN MONTHS. By Nan
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to provide the most stimulating part of the study
to a student of the preventive detention controversy. The authors cannot be faulted on their assembling of the data, but the few conclusions they
draw are a disappointment even for such a preliminary and tentative study as this one. They note
that the prosecution has been reluctant to move for
detention because the constitutionality of the law
has not -been settled, and that numerous alternatives are available to both detention and money
bail which may make it unnecessary to resort to
detention. Finally, they note that both schools of
thought on preventive detention have been somewhat confounded by its virtual non-use.
The authors have slighted the Bail Reform Act
of 19664 which provided the alternatives that they
mention to both detention and bail. Had they examined it more closely, they very likely would have
found why preventive detention has not been used
with any frequency. That act made a more radical
change ir pretrial release procedures than did the
preveritive detention law. The Bail Reform Act
provided a series of non-financial release terms,
starting with release on personal recognizance,
which were to be used to effect pretrial release in
place of the traditional imposition of money bail.
Only as a last resort should any money bail be set
under this act. Preventive detention was added as
a last resort for those few cases in which even
money bail could not ensure the appearance of the
defendant at trial or the safety of the community.
As predicted by a commentator in this Journal,5
preventive detention would be used only rarely if
the rather complex detention statute were properly
applied. The detention statute in no way altered
the scheme of the 1966 act, other than to add a new
last resort. The jddicial officer must fikst find
whether release on personal recognizance is reasonable under the circumstances; then look at assigning the defendant to someone's custody; then
travel restrictions, a 10% appearance bond, a bail
bond, and any other condition whatever, including
nighttime confinement. Only if none of these were
sufficient would the officer need to order preventive
detention. Since there is no limit to the money bail
which can be set, presumably it would be only the
rarest of cases where a bail which is less than astronomic would fail to assure appearance at trial,
a specific person's safety, or the safety of the whole
4 D.C. CODE § 23-1321 (Supp. 1972).

5Comment, Pretrial Detntion in the District of
Columbia: A Common Law Approach, 62 J. C=.
L.C. & P.S. 194, 203-04 (1971).

community. More than prosecutorial reluctance to
propose detention is involved here--the statute itself has made preventive detention unnecessary in
nearly every case where the felony defendant is
eligible for it under the statutory definitions.
The form in which PreventiveDetention is written
obscures what may well be the real reason for the
apparent demise of the concept of preventive detention. This study is a clinical summary and
analysis of what purports to be an innovation in
American criminal procedure. However, one need
only compare the policy statements of former Attorney General Mitchell 6 with the riposte of Professor Tribe7 to find that the driving force behind
the concept was political. The controversy which
raged over the enactment of the law was based in
large measure on emotional preconceived notiops
of what the Constitution ought to allow the forces
of law and order to do on the one hand, and how
it ought to protect the accused-but-not-yetproven-guilty on the other. Neither side of the
debate engaged in much serious study of what
caused the problem of recidivism and what measures might really be effective to deal with it.
We are quite fortunate that the actual process of
criminal justice has not noticeably been affected by
the concept of preventive detention. The salutary
effects of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 in releasing
most defendants before trial, so that they are not
imprisoned unnecessarily, continue. The legislators
are now free to devote their attention to effecting
what may be the best means of combatting recidivism: surer apprehension of criminals and
speedier trials.
JOHN L. ROPIEQuET
Chicago, Illinois

THE

PROBLEm oF CRuE. By Richard Quinney.
New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970. Pp.
viii, 227. $3.95. Paper.
The Problem of Crime is an important book for
both old and new students of criminology for
several reasons. First, it is a concise and yet comprehensive review of most of the central topics of
criminology. Chapters one and two, and part of
chapter three, contain the ideas of European and
6
Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of
Bail Reform, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969); Mitchell,
Wiretapping and Pretrial Detentionw-Balancing the
Rights of the Individual with the Rights of Society, 53 J.
Am JnD. Soc'v 188 (1969).
7 Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in
the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970).
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United States writers, past and present, on: the
conceptions of crime; and the relation of crime to
law, criminal law, natural law, the administration
of justice, and social deviance. These are the ideas
of legalists, anthropologists, and social theorists as
well as persons usually identified as criminologists.
Secondly, this book forces the reader to be aware
of his own philosophic position with regard to the
issue of causality. In the remainder of chapter
three, Quinney notes that there is not a single conception of causation but as many conceptions of it
as there are philosophic traditions. He rejects
logical positivism and says that his own position
is closest to the general philosophical tradition of
idealism. It is based on an "agnostic" ontology, a
nominalistic epistemology, and a distinction between causation as a methodological construct and
causation as a substantive construct. Thirdly, this
book stresses the politicality of crime. While this
theme is evident throughout the book, it is most
prominent in the last two chapters which describe
trends in the United States. In Quinney's words
(p. 180): "Crime is thus becoming more political
in two senses. First, the actions of many criminally
defined persons are actually political behaviors.
And, second, the actions taken in the labeling of
behavior as criminal are political actions. The
criminal law is being used by those in power to
maintain their control over others. Whenever
criminal law is formulated, enforced, and administered, political acts are taking place."
The shortcomings of this book are few indeed.
The minor ones pertain to the use of certain concepts (e.g., society vs. culture), the interpretation
of "some literature (e.g., Goring's refutation of
Lombroso), and the giving of insufficient attention
to certain writers (e.g., Tarde, Nettler). The major
ones pertain to the selection of ideas from only
European and United States thinkers, and the
failure to fully develop certain themes such as the
politicality of crime. Such developments would
obviously require a book of much greater size than
Quinney's. As it stands, it is without question
another valuable contribution of this scholar to
criminology, sociology, and the social sciences.
EDWIN D. DRIVER
University of Massachusetts
No ONE WILL LISSEN: How OUR LEGAL SYsTEM
BRUTALIZES THE YOUTBFUL POOR. By Lois
Forer.NewYork: JohnDay, 1970. Pp. 352.$8.95.
Anyone who starts reading Mrs. Forer's book is
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not likely to stop listening until he reaches the end.
After that may come a period of some bafflement,
as one tries to figure out the next step.
This book is based primarily upon Mrs. Forer's
experience for 18 months as attorney in charge of
the Office for Juveniles, established in Philadelphia
by the Office for Economic Opportunity. In one
aspect-unfortunately a short-lived one--the experience provides a record of great accomplishment;
in another aspect-unfortunately a more lasting
one-a record of tremendous frustration. In short
summary, Mrs. Forer reports that her office
"slowed the assembly line of the Juvenile Court
from eighty cases per judge per day to about thirty
or thirty-five cases," "stopped the practice of having a probation officer decide that a child could be
held in custody for days and days prior to trial,"
and finally so "drastically reduced the population of
the juvenile correctional institutions" that "[alt
one point the juvenile correctional authorities complained that they did not have enough inmates to
operate institutions." (P. 12) The skeptic might
ask: Was this a good thing? Apparently the top
brass in charge of the program did not think so.
They moved the office from its six rooms and two
floors over an auto body repair shop, near the
Juvenile Court, near the detention center, and near
where most of the clients lived, to smaller quarters
further from the Juvenile Court and clients, but
closer to the Director of the Legal Aid who could
keep the office under better supervision. Clients no
longer came in and waited to be seen; either they
called and made appointments in advance or they
came without appointment and made appointments
for later. Gradually the staff fell apart, the clientele
fell off, the defense of juveniles was transferred to
the Defender Association, the caseload disposed
of by each judge increased again, and the population of the detention places returned to normal. In
short, the system was working again.
Obviously this is a sad commentary on the evolution of our juvenile court system, especially when
compared with the eloquent promise of Judge
Julian W. Mack's classic article published in the
Harvard Law Review in 1909. But no one familiar
with Mrs. Forer's accomplishments as a scholar,
practitioner and now judge, can doubt the authority and reliability of her account. Nor do the reports from other urban centers suggest that the
'Mack, The Juvenile Court System, 23 HARv. L.
REv. 104 (1909).
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Philadelphia experience is substantially atypical.2
What then is the road to salvation? Mrs. Forer's
principal emphasis is upon the need for meaningful
representation. Since the period of her experience
began before Gault,3 there may be some basis for
discounting the present significance of this particular remedy, but the picture she paints of mere token
compliance with the right to counsel or no compliance at all, even six months after Gault, suggests
that much more than is presently available in the
way of time, money, and manpower is required
before the ideal of meaningful representation is
approached. (P. 318)
In Mrs. Forer's view not only must juvenile defendants be provided with counsel who have the
time to examine their cases and prepare their defenses, but also with counsel who are intrinsically
qualified and entirely free from institutional loyalties which may conflict with the clients' best interests. She would apply to legal aid institutions
the precept of Canon Thirty-Five of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (P. 329):
The professional services of a lawyer should not
be controlled by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer.
A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are
individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation
to his client should be personal and the responsibility should be direct to the client.
The Canon explicitly excludes "charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent" from the concept of "such intermediaries". Mrs. Forer would
insist on exactly the opposite conclusion. She
emphatically rejects the view attributed to some
2part from many informal reports the general picture is summarized in the Report of President Johnson's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Chapter 3, Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Crime, pp. 55, 79-88 (1967). Mrs. Forer's general conclusions about the operations of the juvenile court
system in Philadelphia are supported by another account by a lawyer intimately involved with the system
for several years, both as assistant district attorney assigned to the court, and later as occasional defense
counsel, Richette, The Throwaway Children (1969).
Although Mrs. Richette paints an equally dismal general picture, she also notes examples of occasional successes, children saved by the personal attention and resourcefulness of devoted and exceptionally gifted court
personnel, frequently assisted by equally devoted volunteers. Such triumphs over the system also deserve to be
celebrated as illustrations of the ideal which Judge Mack
and Jane Addams envisaged.
3In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

poverty lawyers: "You need a different set of
ethics for a poor man's lawyer." (P. 329) She does
not directly challenge the ruling of the Standing
Committee on Ethics of the American Bar Association that: "Offering publicly to render legal
services without charge to citizens who are unable
to pay for them is not unethical." (P. 330) But
she regards as more significant the question:
"Is it unethical to hold out to the public that free
legal services are provided and then furnish somethin different and inferior to what the client would
receive from a lawyer in private practice?" (P. 330)
Emphasis upon the need for adequate legal representation should not divert attention from the
ultimate justification for the juvenile court system
-the provision of appropriate custody, care and
treatment when parental care or supervision is
inadequate. As Judge Mack himself pointed out
in his farsighted analysis, if meaningful care and
treatment is not provided, there is no constitutional basis for involuntary custody without all
the due process safeguards associated with criminal prosecution. It was the appalling lack of such
adequate treatment which provided the motivating background for Mrs. Forer's insistence upon
slowing up the process of commitment until the
availability of all other possible alternatives had
been fully investigated and exhausted. Of course,
a more ambitious solution is to provide the kind
of care and treatment which Judge Mack and his
associates anticipated.4 Surely if there is some
truth in the adage that the sternest test of a
civilization is provided by the humaneness of its
criminal process, the test must be even more
appropriate when applied to the treatment of its
deprived children. The contribution which legal
representation can make to the achievement of
such a solution may appear more negative than
affirmative, and yet it might conceivably be critical. The exposure of the ugly reality, the insistence
that fulfillment of the basic assumption is the
price which must be paid for the continued constitutionality of the system itself, may now be
the most significant contribution which resolute
4 A modern experiment with a novel approach to the
commitment of juveniles is described in Vachon, Hey
Man What Did You Learn in Reform School? SATURDA'
Rxviw, Sept. 16, 1972, at 69. According to this article,
the new Director of the Department of Youth Services
in Massachusetts has closed all the reform schools in
the state and substituted group homes, psychiatric
agencies, prep schools, and more than sixty half-way
houses scattered throughout the state. Id. at 74.
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legal representation can make to the improvement
of the juvenile court system.
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON
Northwestern University School of Law
Tim FELON. By John Irwin. Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1970. Pp. 211. $5.95.
In recent years, the plight of prisons and prisoners has been exposed repeatedly, to the American
Public, by way of riots and disturbances, the formation of ex-offender associations and other prison
reform groups, the literary efforts of offenders, the
surveys and investigations of governmental and
private agencies and, of course, the decisions of the
state and federal courts. All of them point up the
same conclusion, namely that the American criminal justice system and its several components has
failed to control crime and rehabilitate offenders.
This conclusion has been buttressed by the findings
of a number of social scientific studies including
those by Clemmer, Sykes and Polsky. However,
few of them, such as Irwin's book, have succeeded
in presenting a systematic in depth examination of
the correctional experience from the point of view
of the adult felon.
Irwin began his study by analyzing the experiences of a sample of California parolees and the
parole system. However, as the study progressed,
it became apparent that this was a limited approach because other facets of the parolee's life
style impinged upon his responses to his status,
namely his prison and pre-prison experiences.
Therefore he enlarged the study to an analysis of
the career patterns of different types of felons.
There are two major themes that emerge from this
study. The first is that the career pattern of the
felon, whether he is a Hustler, a Dope Fiend, a
Disorganized Criminal or other type of felon, involves a weak, intermittent, ambiguous and oftentimes confusing commitment to crime as a way of
life. This is contrary to a popularly held myth that
there is a single tract, clear cut, increasingly greater
commitment to crime, as a way of life, as the
offender gets older. The second major theme is that
once the felon is arrested he is confronted with a
series of problems that have been created by the
criminal justice system, ostensibly for the purpose
of furthering correctional goals. Some of them are
custodial, others are rehabilitative, and still others
are generated out of ignorance by official representatives of the system. The problem, of course, is
that there is a serious gap between the perspectives
of the officials and the offenders in regard to the

[Vol. 64

techniques and programs that are designed to
implement the goals. Therein lie the seeds of
conflict and misunderstanding between these two
groups. The task of understanding the felon's own
view of this situation, is the focus of this study.
The author approaches his problem from a
framework developed by Sutherland in the first
edition of his Principlesof Criminology (New York:
J. B. Lippincott Co. 1939), namely, that felons
operate within the context of criminal behavior
systems; that through involvement in a subculture, offenders acquire criminal perspectives and
identities. The design of the study involved interviews with 116 inmates, 70 of whom were re-interviewed after their release on parole. Other data
were secured through interviews with employees,
ex-offenders, and correctional officials, attendance
at parole functions and meetings with inmates in
California institutions. Apparently, Irwin was able
to elicit the cooperation and assistance of the
officials, at all levels. Also, a 180-item questionnaire was used, as well as an instrument for classifying felons according to their major and most
recent participation in one of several criminal
behavior systems, including Hustler, Dope Fiend,
Disorganized Criminal, State Raised Youth,
Square John, Head, Thief and Lower Class Man.
The book is organized in terms of the principal
life experiences encountered by the felon namely,
the pre-prison experience, the institutional life,
the community re-entry phase of his career and
the parolee-agent system. The author takes each
of the eight types of felons through these career
phases. There are two major findings that emerge
from this study. The first is that the commitment
of a person to a criminal behavior system is tenuous and intermittent. As the felon enters each
stage he struggles with alternative life styles. In
the process he fails, frequently, to commit himself
to any of them for an extended period. The exceptions are the Lower Class Man and the Square
John, two types of felons who do not have criminal identities.
The second major finding is that there is a gross
disparity of perspectives, on ends and means, between the felons and the officials who are charged
with the responsibility for facilitating their return
to the community. In this regard, this study makes
a major contribution in documenting the conditions that are generated by the correctional system
that hinder rather than help the felon. It is Irwin's
contention that the correctional system has failed
because it has not taken into account the felon's
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perspective and response to official programs and
procedures. The difficulties confronting the felon,
from the moment he enters the criminal justice
system until he leaves it, are legion. The problem
of finding an avenue out of a criminal life style for
the felon is compounded by the fact that he is a
marginal man living on the edges of two worlds,
the criminal and the conventional. In a sense, as
Irwin portrays him, the felon is doomed to failure
before he enters the system. It is small wonder that
few offenders ever "make it," for as Irwin suggests, "the criminal very often changes his life,
refrains from the type of criminal life he once
followed, but he does not become a square; that is,
he does not completely take on conventional
values." (p. 175)
The Felon contributes to an accounting of significant aspects of the criminal justice system, particularly the correctional phase, an accounting
which is long overdue. This book asks and attempts, with much success, to answer the perennial
issue in this field, namely why does the correctional
experience have such a debilitating effect on most
offenders? Is it because they spend the most significant portions of their careers in the correctional
system? Is it because they bring with them a style
of life and a set of attitudes that get reinforced,
not changed during the correctional phase of their
careers? Is it because this system is so organized
that it is literally impossible to avoid its destructive effects and that no reorganization of its structure can mitigate them? Or is it because the community is still reluctant to surrender its concern
over control of offenders when crucial decisions are
being made about them? Irwin suggests that a
partial answer lies in the restructuring of the entire
correctional system from the perspective of the
felon, and not solely from the perspective of the
requirements of the community. He is uniquely
qualified to examine this issue, not only because
as a sociologist he has addressed himself to it
from a social scientific viewpoint, but also, because
he has experienced the felon's concerns and problems himself, having served time in the California
correctional system. The Felon is an informative
and important book. Hopefully, it will encourage
others to explore the problems of the offender
from his own point of view.
ALBERT ELrAs

Superintendent
Youth Reception and Correction Center
Yardville, N. J.

TAE Gom... RED Ru)ENs-y. By Morris (Red)
Rudensky and Don Riley. Edited by John If.
Sullivan, Jr.Blue Earth, Minn.: The Piper Co.,
1970. Pp. 215. $7.95.
The title of the book comes from a Yiddish
word, alternately transliterated as gonef and
gonov, and translated to mean a thief, crook, mischievous prankster, shady character, or wise guy.
It has somewhat the flavor of such English words
as rascal and scoundrel, in that it connotes, in some
contexts, a strongly pejorative tone, and in others
an affectionate one. It might make an interesting
study in the sociology of language to determine
under what circumstances and with what effects
for the socialization process words or phrases descriptive of the criminal are applied to the funloving and the ingenious.
Whatever this built-in ambiguity, which serves
to mollify the derogatory tone of Rudensky's
memoir, the subject of this first-person book was an
ordinary criminal, not a clever kid in and out of a
little mischief, although his initiation into the
world of crime started at a tender enough age to
allow for such a description. He was an ordinary
criminal not only in that he committed the usual
larcenous acts for which some people are apprehended and spend time in prisons (and he spent
lots of time there, a sizable portion of his adult
life), but because there was nothing unusual or
extraordinary about the man. He had no insights,
no special abilities, and the years in prison do not
sparkle with the profundity that came from the
pen of an Eldridge Cleaver or a George Jackson.
Instead, we are treated 'to a couple of hundred
pages of dreary prose. Did the man not have a
single experience in prison worth narrating? Did
he not have a single flash of understanding of the
human condition? Evidently not.
The problem with this book is that the day for
such banality has passed, and perhaps it should
never have been with us, but at one time it was.
After Attica and the Fortune Society, after the
bodies that were dug up in the prison yards and
the nationwide resurgence of interest in prison
reform, after the civil rights revolution and the
politicalization of the black and Spanish-speaking
prisoners, this book sounds as if it were prepared
for a freshman writing class about half a century
ago. Wake up, Rudensky, the world has passed
you by.
Like many of his fellow-Americans (and Rudensky, let me reiterate, is just an ordinary person,
which is probably the chief disqualification for an
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author), this man stood in awe before famous
people. Of Al Capone, whom he so proudly proclaims (one might say brags) was his cellmate, he
writes: "Despite his sinister reputation, Capone
was a family man and religious too." This does
not speak well for either family or religion; perhaps
one can substitute the name of Hitler for Capone,
and the sentence will be just as accurate. Yes,
Rudensky respects Capone, not only as one loyal
to his family, but for two other reasons: "He had
kept his hopes flaming to the end and he had
never apologized for his way of life."
As I went through one discouraging chapter
after another, I too kept my hopes flaming to the
end. Margaret Mitchell, of Gone With the Wind
fame, briefly comes into Rudensky's life while he
is serving time in Atlanta, and there is more
sycophancy before this novelist. His encounter
with the Communist leader, Earl Browder, was
likewise unproductive for Rudensky or for his
readers.
Finally, having spent more time in prisons than
out from the ages of 12 to 47, Rudensky is a free
man. He stops in Chicago, where he spends time
with Ralph Capone and "his lovely family," and
then we are treated to the following exercise in
elegant prose:
At the depot, I called Margaret Mitchell and
her hubby. She could hardly believe her ears
and kept repeating, "Red, Red, is this really
you-are you really out?"
If philosophers were kings and men of letters were
prosecutors and judges, people would be in prison
for writing and publishing a book containing such
a passage.
But Rudensky does emerge from prison, the
gates are officially opened (he has had in the past
successful and unsuccessful escape efforts), and he
settles down to a good life. It is not age itself that
rehabilitates him-although there is evidence that
aging is the most decriminalizing force in society;
rather, Rudensky is given an excellent opportunity
by an ex-convict who has dedicated his successful
business life to offering jobs to former prisoners.
There is no stigmatization and no concealment:
the men are working and living in the community,
openly avowing their past. A transformation,
almost magical, comes over them. Their motivation to commit crimes is reduced to a vanishing
point. The lesson is clear, and should be restated
and studied: the answer to recidivism is employment, and the road to rehabilitation is the belief of
a man that he has been welcomed with warm
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embrace into the arms of a humanity from which
he had once been expelled.
Perhaps 200-odd pages of mediocrity and dullness are worth wading through in order to arrive
at this note of hope.
EDWARD SAGARIN

City College of New York
THE FRYING-PAN: A PRISON AND ITS PRISONERS.

By Tony Parker.New York: Basic Books, 1970.
Pp. xvi, 222. $6.95.
The Frying-Pan, by Tony Parker, is a book of
tape recorded interviews of about 28 prisoners,
3 staff members, 2 wives of staff members and a
prisoner's wife at Grendon-Underwood, "England's
first and only psychiatric prison." Mr. Parker is
identified on the back flap of the dust cover as
a "well-known author and television writer who
was permitted by the British Government to
stay at Grendon prison and conduct interviews
without subsequent supervision or censorship."
This book is entertaining rather than informative. It does not say much about Grendon Prison.
The author admits to this on page 211, when he
states, "The progressive penological thinking practiced at Grendon thoroughly deserves informed
study and a wide audience; a book of such kind is
greatly needed and will undoubtedly fulfill 'a long
felt want.' I am sure one day someone will write
it. In the meantime however my concern was with
producing something quite different: a simple
account giving some idea of the sort of people
imprisoned there, either as prisoners or as members
of the staff."
Tie Frying-Panis a simple account of some of
the people of Grendon. In fact, it is too simple.
It is obvious that the author over-edited the recordings. In his effort to condense the interviews,
he has made all of the subjects sound too pat,
too stereotyped. Even where an effort is made
for selected ones to appear tough, the author has
the subjects using obscenities like a ten-year-old
boy who has learned a new swear word.
Chapter headings provide colorful stereotyping
with groupings such as "A Few Hard Nuts," "The
Wicked Uncle," "Good-Hearted Harry," "The
False-Pretense Merchants," "Some Bad Bad Bastards" and "The Nonces." The impression is that
the people in those categories are not people, but
are characters with permanent roles in life, whether
in prison or out of prison.
I would like to have learned something about
Grendon. Since it is unique in England, what
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contribution has it made to the field of corrections?
How does it compare with other methods of treatment and confinement? What theories and philosophies were implemented in the planning, building, and operating of Grendon? The Frying-Pan
does not provide this information, but the author
did not intend that it should. What this book does
provide is a delightful cast of characters of inmates
and non-inmates who "are imprisoned at
Grendon." These characters may some evening
appear on another confinement facility, television,
to entertain its captives.
JomHN A. WEBSTER
University of Illinois-Circle Campus
Chicago, Illinois

Edited by Franco Ferracuti, Renato Lazzari, and Marvin Wolfgang.
Rome: Mario Bulzone Editore, 1970. Pp. 164.
Paperbound, $5.00.
Until discovered recently by tourists as an
out-of-the-way place unlikely to have been visited
by the Jones, Sardinia was a splendidly isolated
island remote from both the Italian context and
the suffocating embrance of modernization. Not
exactly Shangri-La, this 160 by 90 mile wide island,
the second largest in the Mediterranean after
Sicily, has nonetheless been conquered and subjugated by just about every major empire in this
cradle of civilization area. Chronic misrule, exploitation, prolonged feudalism, and a mountainous terrain largely inhospitable to agriculture
and to internal geographic mobility, has perpetuated a pastoral society, and honed a fiercely
independent people with an abhorrence of authority, however legitimate. Since the western
shore of Sardinia is more readily accessible than
the eastern, foreign invasions as well as most of the
development of the island has been in the western
portion: the farther east inland, the greater the
resistance to social change and modernization.
This pastoral milieu of distrusting and alienated
folk has spawned not only a ritualistic and inward
looking mentality, but a society in which the
major crimes-kidnapping, murder, and cattle
(sheep) stealing called abigeao-reflect and highlight a rapidly disappearing life style. The impact
of tourism, urbanization, and mainland influences
is altering just about everything on the island
including traditional criminal patterns, and even
the demography and ecology of crime.
Violence in Sardinia is consequently a most
timely volume. The editors, Ferracuti, Lazzari,
VIOLEN E iN SARDrTA.

and Wolfgang, use Sardinia as a dramatic and
realistic culture case study to test the validity of
the subculture of violence thesis. The book does
more than assess the Wolfgang-Ferracuti theme.
In fact, it is only at the very end of the volume
that empirical evidence on Sardinian and mainland
violent and property offenders is presented to test
this theme.
Luca Pinna, a Sardinian sociologist, is masterful
in describing and analyzing the socio-historical
forces which have shaped modem Sardinian society. Professor Camba and his collaborators
surprise us pleasantly with their detailed and well
presented analysis of regional patterns of past and
present criminality on the island. Their ecological
and demographic descriptions are accompanied by
12 tables and 24 charts 4nd graphs, nearly all in
color, as well as a color insert of Sardinia by geoeconomic areas. Judge Giuseppe di Gennaro has
written an incisive, if all too brief, comparison and
analysis of the legal considerations involved in
prosecuting and sentencing Sardinian and mainland homicide offenders. The medical director of
the Rebibbian Observation Center, using the
results of the battery of diagnostic tools available
to him, presents individual diagnoses of each subject as well as group classifications (normal, psychopathic personality, other). Dr. Fontanesi's two
case histories illustrate the variety and depth of
clinical material collected in this research enterprise.
All of this fascinating interweaving of the historical, legal, sociological, ecological, and clinical is
submitted as a necessary precondition for examining the subculture of violence theme-a perspective which argues that the expression of individual
violence has been embedded very deeply in the
cultural norms of the Sardinians and particularly
in the normative structure of the inhabitants of
the very pastoral Barbagia region. Using their
sensitizing perspective, Ferracuti, Lazzari, and
Wolfgang submit three major hypotheses sets for
test:
1. Sardinian and non-Sardinian homicide offenders should show consistently different behavior
patterns especially in their family histories and
interaction patterns, and on the psychological
trait level (e.g., the former should have little or
no anxiety or guilt concerning the homicide).
2. Sardinian murders should be relatively free
of psychopathology.
3. Sardinian offenders of all types should be
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culturally more homogeneous than mainland
offenders.
The human material for study was drawn from
all offenders, 18-25 years of age, serving a minimum
four year sentence who were diagnosed and classified at the Italian prison system's Observation
Center at Rebibbia (Rome). Of the 1500 cases
processed at this Observation Center, the authors
included all 26 non-violent Sardinians, 30 similar
property offenders from other parts of Italy (but
not Calabria or Sicily), and 30 murderers each
from Sardinia and from the mainland. The criteria
for selection are spelled out carefully and involve
consecutive intake, the definitiveness of the data
available in their case folders, and prison interpersonal adjustment (e.g., violent incidents).
Using this incredibly large and detailed array
of information-extensive medical, neuro-psychiatric, personality, and social history protocolsthe authors find solid and substantial evidence to
support their subculture of violence thesis. In
their own words, "No data run contrary to the
basic hypothesis of the existence of violent socially learned and reinforced responses in Sardinian
violent offenders." The Sardinian violent criminals
show less psychopathology, guilt, and parental
rejection, and conversely, greater explosiveness,
hostility, and cruelty in their offenses.
While by no means the definitive test of the
subculture of violence thesis, Violence in Sardinia
comes as close to operationalizing and validating
this sensitizing concept as the state of the art
will presently permit.
SIMON DINITZ

Ohio State University
AS A HtrmAN PRocEss. By John
Hogarth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press
in association with the Centre of Criminology,
1971. Pp. xiv, 434. $15.00.
This is a thorough, balanced study of the variables that go into the sentencing decisions made by
magistrates in Ontario. These magistrates have
wide jurisdiction, covering most of the offenses
dealt with by both county and district courts in
the United States, so nearly all the variables of
offense and offender met in the vast majority of
criminal cases could be dealt with by a study of 71.
of the 83 magistrates in the province. Analyses of
court records alone are limited to a "black box,"
input-output analysis of decision making processes.
To go beyond these, Hogarth and his associates
SENTENCING
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determined the effects of judges "informationspace" (what facts are considered important, how
these facts are related to each other, and which
facts are considered "over-riding"), perceived
legal "room" for maneuver (ways judges worked
with and through the feasible alternatives), social
constraints (all the forces of expectation in the
community), and the judges personalities. Personality measures consisted of attitude scales developed both by Likert methods and factor analysis using statements identified in extensive interviewing with the judges themselves. On the grounds
that these statements were developed out of the
judges experience the study is "phenomenological"
in the best sense.
Although the author has developed numerous
"technical appendices" which are not included in
the book and although he makes a strenuous and
commendable effort to interpret statistical measures in non-technical language, the sheer multitude
of findings and of statistical tests (all quite appropriate to the data involved) is somewhat
staggering. When the findings are raised to a
moderately high level of generality, they tend to
conform to stereotypes about judicial behavior.
For example, the tremendous variability among
judges is explained, in the last analysis, by fundamentally different penal philosophies. These are
correlated with rural-urban differences, beliefs
about the functions of sentencing, cognitive complexity, reference groups, knowledge about crime
causation, and sentencing behavior. The consistency of these various aspects of judicial behavior
is explained by sophisticated forms of dissonance
theory. Indeed one of the most useful sections of
the book is the identification of the type of situation which sentencing comprises and how, in this
type of situation, the consistency of judicial behavior is to be expected.
The combination of extensive interviewing, completion of questionnaires, and anlysis of "sentencing study sheets" which many magistrates were to
complete for 100 actual cases that came before
them created seminal opportunities for comparison of general attitudes and the thought processes
used in actual decisions. Most of these followed
the consistency pattern, but the judges rated
"reformation" higher as a general purpose of
sentencing than they did when their rationales for
individual decisions were averaged out. In the
latter, "individual deterrence" out-ranked reformation.
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Unfortunately, only 68 percent of the requested
sentencing study sheets were turned in, and the
distribution from the different judges was, as one
would expect, uneven. The author deals with this
problem carefully. However in a few places, the
rationale for the manipulation of data is not clear.
For example, numbers assigned to ratings are
assumed to be equal interval figures when ratings
are multiplied by frequencies. Also, separate items
in some scales seem to be somewhat arbitrarily
combined into categories. By and large, however,
the study contains excellent methodology.
The major contributions of the study include:
1) the identification and measurement of variables
which are to be considered in all studies of judicial
behavior, 2) the identification of syndromes of
attitude and behavior that cohere to produce
definable patterns of sentencing, 3) the identification of devices by which judicial behavior may be
predicted with some accuracy, and 4) the application of general principles of decision-making to the
sentencing process.
The one value-bias the author states is a conviction that decisions should be based on all the
available information. This conviction leads to an
emphasis in the main body of the book on how the
magistrates gather, process, and utilize information and to an emphasis in the recommendations
for action of how more comprehensive information
may be brought to bear on cases before judges.
Overall, the book is a valuable one. Judges
should read it to become aware of the processes
they use in decision-making; those responsible for
nominating or appointing judges should read it and
utilize its findings in the selection processes; and
criminologists should read it as a profound study
of an important social process.
WILLIAM R. ARNOLD
The University of Kansas
CRw.rM AND SocrL POLICY. By Daniel
Glaser. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1972. Pp. viii, 128. $5.95.
This small hard-cover book is one of a series,
now numbering more than a dozen, put out by
Prentice-Hall on various critical situations, viewed
as social issues in need of social policy. Included
in the series are books on mental health, the family, education, the poor, violence, women, and
now adult crime. According to the editor of the
series, "it represents a unique effort to give scholars, practitioners, policy-makers, students, and
ADULT

laymen a series of volumes that not only draw
together theoretical propositions, empirical findings, and intelligent sociological observations, but
also use the acumen of the social sciences to suggest approaches, programs, and methods of remedying and ameliorating undesirable social conditions and behavior."
As is true of such series, Glaser's book is a
gathering-up, a summation, of research, and not a
report of original research or theory by the author.
Usually the publisher sets a general uniform pattern for a series, limits the length of each book, and
establishes a style suitable for the anticipated
readers. The author agrees to write to these
specifications. The result is a condensation into a
hundred pages of text of the various subjects
usually elaborated into six hundred or more
pages in a college textbook. It is within these
limitations that Glaser's book must be judged.
Glaser is well grounded in the various -aspects
of criminology, is a competent researcher, and a
critical thinker. This book reflects his breadth of
knowledge and displays an ability to write free of
sociological jargon. The text is documented and an
up-to-date bibliography is provided.
Since the book is limited to adult crime, Glaser
dearly draws the legal. line between juvenile delinquency and adult crime, but reaches back into
the juvenile period in establishing the continuity
of behavior between childhood, adolescence, and
adulthood. This is one example of his placing
criminal behavior in the general psychological and
sociological framework for analysis of all behavior.
Crime is human behavior that develops under
certain conditions, just as legal behavior results
from other conditions. Thus, crime is not set forth
as peculiar or abnormal behavior that cannot be
understood within the range of general theories of
behavior.
Glaser uses a classification of crime common to
most criminologists but couched in slightly different terms. His categories are predatory crimes
(against persons and against property), illegal
selling and consumption, illegal performance, and
criminal negligence. Types of criminals are related
to types of crime, but note is taken of the fact
that many criminals (except professionals) do not
specialize in only one type of crime.
The author lists a "few variables demonstrated
by research to be statistical indicators of commitment" to criminal behavior: prior criminality,
certain prior sources of income, certain prior types
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of social relationships, subcultural values that
support crime, and certain personality traits. The
ways in which these five variables reinforce each
other or pose conflicts are not elaborated.
In Chapter 3 a new typology is set up called
"policy relevant typifications of adult crime careers." The earlier typology is modified to suggest
that differential policies are needed for different
types of criminal. This is perhaps the most original
and interesting part of the book, the part where
Glaser displays not only his knowledge of criminology but his ingenuity in suggesting new approaches. For example, the term "adolescence
recapitulators" is applied to the vast number of
young men in prison for non-professional and
inept types of personal or property predation.
Like the teenager, they are still struggling for
secure adult status. Glaser reviews what is being
done and suggests what might be done to close
the gap between unorganized adolescence and
secure adulthood. Other categories are subcultural
assaulters, addiction-supporting predators, vocational predators, organized illegal sellers, avocational predators, crisis-vacillation predators,
quasi-insane assaulters, addicted performers, and
private illegal consumers. For each type, some
pertinent information is given, a description of
policies and programs now in use, and suggestions
for further programs. In this section Glaser makes
a number of value judgments regarding programs,
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unsupported by research, apparently growing out
of his own value system or his wide knowledge of
criminal behavior. These are clearly differentiated
from the documented results of programs and
may be accepted or rejected by the reader.
Three final chapters are devoted to critical
discussions of the deficiencies of police, courts, and
corrections. An undue amount of space is devoted
to details of the three systems and emphasis seems
to be on shortcomings. Perhaps there are few
innovative programs to be discussed for police
and courts. The last chapter, on corrections,
briefly reviews some newer approaches to rehabilitation, with emphasis on ways to reintegrate the
criminal into society after his release from prison
on parole: work release, halfway houses, and
counseling.
The book covers in brief form a vast array of
topics. Some of its imbalances have already been
mentioned. One that has not is the complete
omission of discussion of women criminals, even
though it is well known that they differ from men
in types of crime, prior conditions, types of treatment, and types of prison frustrations. The values
of the book outweigh the deficiencies, many of
which seem attributable to the limitation on
length. The book is well worth reading.
RuTH SHONLE CAVAN

Northern Illinois University

